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CASE NOTES
resolve the questions left unanswered in Knolls and will again have to
confront the inconsistencies and confusion fostered by the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test. Knolls will not provide much guidance.
Constitutional Law-FIRST AMENDMENT OVERRIDES MUNICIPAL AT-
TEMPT TO ZONE ADULT BOOKSTORES AND THEATERS-Alexander v. Ciy
of Minneapoh's, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983).
In recent years several municipalities have attempted to prevent com-
munity deterioration by enacting zoning ordinances designed to restrict
the location of adult bookstores and theaters., Government interest in
controlling crime and preventing property devaluation2 often has
clashed with the right to distribute non-obscene sexually oriented mate-
rial.3 To survive constitutional scrutiny, a zoning ordinance which cur-
tails public access to adult entertainment must be narrowly drawn and
further a substantial and compelling governmental interest. If the ordi-
nance imposes any content limitations on the purveyors of adult en-
tertainment, or if it restricts the public's right to patronize such
entertainment in any significant way, it will be found unconstitutional.4
1. See Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980); Hart Book Stores v.
Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980); Kacar, Inc. v.
Zoning Hearing Bd. of Allentown, 60 Pa. Commw. 582, 432 A.2d 310 (1981); Northend
Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978) (en banc).
2. In Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated an ordinance which in effect allowed adult theaters
to operate only in areas of zones for light and heavy industry. These areas included
swamps, warehouses, and railroad tracks. Id at 1209. In Keego Harbor Co. v. City of
Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981), the city enacted an ordinance which prohib-
ited the placement of an adult theater within 500 feet of an establishment licensed to sell
liquor, a church or a school, or within 250 feet of a residential zone. The owner of the only
adult bookstore in the city was prohibited from doing business because no location existed
which was not within 500 feet of the theater. Id at 96. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
struck down the ordinance. Id at 98. "Keego Harbor does not merely disperse adult
theatres within its jurisdiction but effectively bans them." Id.
3. A leading constitutional law scholar has written, "Any government action aimed
at communicative impact is presumptively at odds with the first amendment. For if the
constitutional guarantee means anything, it means that, ordinarily at least, 'government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content .... .' L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 581 (1978)
(quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). The government
must have a valid justification for enacting an ordinance which would have an impact on
protected communication such as nonobscene adult entertainment.
4. See Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). The court inSchad quoted Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), for the following proposition:
[A] zoning ordinance can withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear
showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and sub-
stantial government interest. . . . [T]he onus of demonstrating that no less in-
trusive means will adequately protect the compelling state interest and that the
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In Alexander v. City of Minneapohs, 5 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that a Minneapolis zoning ordinance6 which regulated the
challenged statute is sufficiently narrowly drawn, is upon the party seeking to
justify the burden.
Id at 18.
Minneapolis' Mayor Donald Fraser recently vetoed the city's proposed anti-
pornography ordinance because he doubted its constitutionality. The proposed ordinance
would have amended the city's civil rights ordinance by providing women violated by
pornography a cause of action against purveyors of pornography. The Mayor stated, "I
would rather err on the side of defending the First Amendment." Minneapolis Star and
Tribune, Jan. 6, 1984, at IA, cols. 1-2.
5. 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983).
6. The challenged ordinance, Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 540.410
(1977), stated:
Regulated uses. (a) [Purpose.] In the development and execution of this section,
it is recognized that there are some uses which, because of their very nature, are
recognized as having serious objectionable operational characteristics, particu-
larly when several of them are concentrated under certain circumstances thereby
having a deleterious effect upon the use and enjoyment of adjacent areas. Spe-
cial regulation of these uses is necessary to insure that these adverse effects will
not contribute to the blighting or downgrading of the surrounding neighbor-
hood. These special regulations are itemized in this section. The primary con-
trol or regulation is for the purpose of preventing a concentration of these uses in
any one area. Uses subject to these controls are as follows: adult-only book-
stores, adults-only motion picture theaters, massage parlors, rap parlors and
saunas ...
(c) [Distance-restriction fom certain districts and facilities.] No adults-only motion
picture theater, adults-only bookstore, massage parlor, rap parlor or sauna shall
be operated or maintained within five hundred (500) feet of a residentially zoned
district, an office-residence zoned district, a church, a state-licensed day care fa-
cility and public educational facilities which serve persons age seventeen (17) or
younger, an elementary school or a high school.
(d) [Distance restriction between uses.] No adults-only motion picture theater,
adults-only bookstore, massage parlor, rap parlor or sauna shall be operated or
maintained within five hundred (500) feet of any other adults-only theater,
adults-only bookstore, massage parlor, rap parlor or sauna.
(e) [Measurement.] The distance limitations in subsections (c) and (d) shall be
measured in a straight line from the main public entrances of said premises, or
from the lot lines of properties in residentially or office-residential zoned districts.
() [Amortization of nonconforming uses.] Establishments in violation of subsections
(c) and (d) shall be permitted by section 532.20 as a nonconforming use. As to
those establishments which have a nonconforming use status, the provisions of
sections 532.30 through 532.100 shall apply and, in addition, such use shall be-
come unlawful on and after July 1, 1981.
(g) [Investigation ofexisting uses.] Prior to January 1, 1979, the zoning administra-
tor shall cause to be investigated the status of every adults-only motion picture
theater, adults-only bookstore, massage parlor, rap parlor and sauna in the city,
as to length of continuous operation and determine which uses would become
unlawful on July 1, 1981, with the use of longest continuous operation having
precedence over uses subsequent in time or duration. Appeals from the determi-
nation of the zoning administrator shall be pursuant to sections 534.40 through
534.60 and 534.200. The city council may, upon receiving the recommendation
of the zoning administrator, extend said date where the appellant establishes
that discontinuance of the use on July 1, 1981, results in a taking of a valuable
property interest held by the appellant on the effective date of this section with-
out the payment of just compensation. (77-Or- 110, § 1, 5-13-77).
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location of non-obscene 7 adult entertainment 8 could not be upheld as a
legitimate constraint on protected communication. 9 The court sustained
the finding of the trial judge that the ordinance would substantially re-
strict access to adult theaters and bookstores.1o Thus, the ordinance
could not survive under the limited exception to the general prohibition
against content based regulations."
A city may zone the location of adult theaters and bookstores in order
to control blight on surrounding neighborhoods, if the zoning law does
not significantly reduce the number or availablility of adult theaters and
bookstores, or the public's right of access. This exception was successfully
asserted by the City of Detroit in the United States Supreme Court case
of Young v. American Mini Theaters. 12 Unlike the Detroit ordinance, which
left the market for adult entertainment essentially unrestrained, the Min-
neapolis ordinance had a constitutionally impermissible impact on free-
dom of speech and press. The Minneapolis ordinance would have
allowed only a limited number of existing adult theaters and bookstores
to continue operating and would have disallowed the establishment of
7. Defendants conceded that the adult books and films distributed by the plaintiffs
were non-obscene material. Alexander, 698 F.2d at 938. The Supreme Court formulated a
tripartite test for obscenity in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), wherein it states:
The basic guidelines for the trier of facts must be: (a) whether the average
person applying contemporary community standards would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law, and (c) whether the work taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id at 24.
8. Plaintiff Alexander had an ownership interest in six adult bookstores in Minneap-
olis located at 401 East Hennepin Avenue, 624 Hennepin Avenue, 429 Hennepin Avenue,
327 East Lake Street, 735 East Lake Street, and 2968 Lyndale Avenue South. He also had
an interest in four movie theaters: the Rialto located at 735 East Lake Street; the Frank-
lin, at 1021 Franklin Avenue East; and the American and Empress Theaters at 614-616
Hennepin Avenue. Plaintiff Jochim managed Alexander's theaters. Plaintiff Vegas Cin-
ema Corp., owner of the Avalon Theater at 1500 East Lake Street, intervened in the
action. Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 531 F. Supp. 1162 (D. Minn. 1982).
9. Alexander, 698 F.2d at 936.
10. The trial court found that the ordinance regulated both new and existing facili-
ties. Under the ordinance, all five adult theaters and seven to nine bookstores would be
required to relocate. They would compete with eighteen existing saunas, massage parlors,
and rap parlors for twelve possible legal sites for relocation. Id at 938.
11. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
12. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The court in Young sustained a constitutional attack on a
1972 amendment to a Detroit Anti-Skid Row Ordinance regulating the establishment of
new adult theaters. The ordinance had the effect of dispersing clusters of adults-only facil-
ities so that one adult theater could not be located within 1000 feet of any other "regu-
lated uses" or within 500 feet of a residential area. The ordinance did not apply to
existing movie theaters and bookstores. An adult establishment was defined as one used to
present "materials distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting,
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new adults-only facilities.13
In May 1977, the Minneapolis City Council and the City Planning
Commission enacted Minneapolis Ordinance Section 540.410 for the
stated purposes of regulating the establishment and operation of various
adults-only enterprises14 and preventing the deterioration of adjacent
neighborhoods resulting from a heavy concentration of adult facilities in
a narrowly circumscribed area. 15 The ordinance contained two major
restrictions. The first prohibited an adults-only facility from operating
within five hundred feet of a residence or office-residence zoned district, a
church, a state-licensed day-care facility, or a public educational facility
serving persons aged seventeen or younger. 16 The second barred an
adults-only facility from operating within five hundred feet of any other
adults-only facility.17 Although the ordinance provided three alterna-
tives to closing existing establishments,18 evidence presented at trial indi-
cated that the provisions did not significantly reduce the negative impact
of the ordinance on access to protected sexually oriented material.19
The plaintiffs in Alexander had interests in six adult bookstores and four
motion picture theaters in Minneapolis. They instituted an action
against the city and individually named city officials, 20 alleging that sec-
tion 540.410 was unconstitutional because it represented an unlawful
prior restraint on free speech and press. 2' Defendants, relying on Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 22 contended that the ordinance merely restricted
13. Alexander, 531 F. Supp. 1162 (D. Minn. 1982).
14. Such adult enterprises included bookstores, theaters, saunas, massage parlors, and
"rap parlors." The complaint, however, concerned only theaters and bookstores. The
court did not rule on the validity of the ordinance with respect to other adult establish-
ments. Alexander, 698 F.2d at 936.
15. See supra note 6.
16. Id
17. Id.
18. 698 F.2d at 939. The alternatives provided for an administrative extension in
which the owner could recoup his business investment, change the nature of his business to
fall outside the definition of adult bookstore or theater, or move the business to an area
permitting adult uses under section 540.410 of the ordinance. Id
19. Id
20. Plaintiffs brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against defen-
dants City of Minneapolis, William A. Nordrum, Jr., the Zoning Administrator for the
City of Minneapolis, and Anthony Bouza, the Police Chief for the City of Minneapolis.
21. See 531 F. Supp. at 1163. Plaintiffs alleged section 540.410 violated their first and
fourteenth amendment rights because it was an unlawful prior restraint of free speech and
press, denied them equal protection, was vague and overbroad, and was an establishment
of religion. Id The court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to
bookstores and movie theaters because it substantially restricted access to first amendment
protected activities. The holding made it unnecessary for the court to address the other
constitutional issues. Id at 1173.
22. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In Young, the Supreme Court upheld a Detroit ordinance
similar to the Minneapolis ordinance which prohibited adult bookstores, theaters, and
other "regulated uses" from locating within 1000 feet of any other such use or within 500
feet of a residential area. Id at 52. The court stated:
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the locations of sexually oriented entertainment and caused only an inci-
dental impact on free speech and press; justifiable, they argued, as an
exercise of the city's police power.23
Both the district court and circuit court found the city's reliance on
Young inappropriate. While both agreed that in limited circumstances a
content-based regulation could be found constitutional,24 they distin-
guished Young from Alexander. The Detroit ordinance upheld in Young
contained a grandfather clause exempting existing businesses from the
new regulation; the Minneapolis ordinance did not.25 Furthermore, the
Detroit ordinance did not significantly decrease the number of adult the-
aters and bookstores in operation.26 As Justice Stevens noted in Young,
the decision would have been "quite different if the [Detroit] ordinance
had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful
speech." 27
In Young, the Court allowed Detroit's interest in structuring and regu-
lating the use of property for commercial purposes to prevail over the
right of public access to adult entertainment.2 8 The Court found the
Since what is ultimately at stake is nothing more than a limitation on the place
where adult films may be exhibited, even though the determination of whether a
particular film fits that characterization turns on the nature of its content, we
conclude that the city's interest in the present and future character of its neigh-
borhoods adequately supports its classification of motion pictures.
Id at 71-72.
23. 531 F. Supp. at 1163.
24. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981);
see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (a state may impose reasonable
restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech).
25. Alexander, 698 F.2d at 938. Most adult zoning ordinances passed since Young have
contained grandfather clauses allowing pre-existing, nonconforming businesses to con-
tinue to operate. See, e.g., Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1212 n. 18 (7th Cir.
1980); Bayside Enters. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 702 n.9 (M.D. Fla. 1978). But see
Ellwest Stereo Theaters v. Byrd, 472 F. Supp. 702, 706 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
26. 427 U.S. at 50. The Court stated,
The ordinances are not challenged on the ground that they impose a limit on the
total number of adult theaters which may operate in the city of Detroit. There is
no claim that distributors or exhibitors of adult films are denied access to the
market or, conversely, that the viewing public is unable to satisfy its appetite for
sexually explicit fare. Viewed as an entity, the market for this commodity is
essentially unrestrained.
Id at 62.
27. Id. at 71 n.35.
28. Id at 62-63. When the original Anti-Skid Row Ordinance was proposed in 1962,
the Detroit Common Council determined that the concentration of certain property uses
in a limited area may adversely affect a neighborhood. When the 1972 ordinance was
introduced, adult bookstores and movie theaters were included among the regulated uses
because the number of adult entertainment businesses had substantially increased. Advo-
cates of the restrictions included real estate experts and urban planners who believed that
the location of several adult entertainment establishments in the same neighborhood
tended to attract too many undesirable transients, had an adverse effect on property val-
ues, increased crime, and prompted other businesses and residents to relocate. Id at 54-
1984]
5
et al.: Constitutional Law—First Amendment Overrides Municipal Attempt to
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
city's plan to control property use adequate to support an innovative
regulation implicating first amendment concerns only incidentally.2 9 In
contrast, the district court in Alexander noted that the impact of the Min-
neapolis ordinance went beyond merely restricting the location of adult
bookstores and theaters. 30 The court observed that enforcement of the
ordinance would significantly curtail the public's access to adult books
and films. 3 1 The court concluded that for an ordinance to be constitu-
tional, it must incorporate reasonable time, place and manner restric-
tions, a significant state interest, and the availability of adequate
alternative channels of communication.32
The appellate court found that Minneapolis' failure to permit suffi-
cient access to constitutionally protected materials made its zoning ordi-
nance unenforceable. 33 The court gave little weight to the city's
contention that adult businesses could remain at their present locations if
their inventory of sexually oriented material was reduced below forty
percent, 34 noting that adults-only facilities attempting to comply with
29. The Young Court stated,
Putting to one side for the moment the fact that adult motion picture theaters
must satisfy a locational restriction not applicable to other theaters, we are also
persuaded that the 1,000-foot restriction does not, in itself, create an impermissi-
ble restraint on protected communication. The city's interest in planning and
regulating the use of property for commercial purposes is clearly adequate to
support that kind of restriction applicable to all theaters within the city limits.
In short, apart from the fact that the ordinances treat adult theaters differently
from other theaters and the fact that the classification is predicated on the con-
tent of material shown in the respective theaters, the regulation of the place
where such films may be exhibited does not offend the First Amendment.
Id at 62-63.
30. 531 F. Supp. at 1173.
31. Id at 1170.
32. Id at 1173. Reasonable regulations of the time, place, and manner of protected
speech, where those regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests,
are permitted under the first amendment. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104 (1972) (ban on willful making of any noise adjacent to school grounds which disturbs
the good order of school session); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (ban on demon-
strations in or near a courthouse with the intent to obstruct justice); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949) (limitation on use of sound trucks).
33. The district court found that enforcement of the ordinance would "have the effect
of substantially reducing the number of adult bookstores and theaters in Minneapolis"
and also found that "there are only a handful of relocation sites" for the businesses in
violation of the ordinance. 531 F. Supp. at 1172. In addition, the court found that under
the ordinance no locations would be available for new bookstores or theaters. Id. "This
ordinance is in stark contrast to the ordinance upheld in Young in which a 'myriad' of
locations were available to new theaters and bookstores, and existing ones were completely
unaffected." Id at 1171.
34. Section 540.410(b)(1) of the Minneapolis ordinance defined an adult bookstore as
a business "having forty (40) percent or more of its dollar volume in trade, [in] books,
magazines, and other periodicals" relating to adult themes. 531 F. Supp. at 1173-74.
Adult theaters were defined in a similar manner in section 540.410(b)(2). Id at 1174.
Thus, a bookstore or theater with less than forty percent of adult material would not fall
under the ordinance. Testimony at the district court level, however, indicated that a
[Vol. 10
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the forty percent provisions in the ordinance would face great practical
difficulties in doing business. 35 The court was equally unpersuaded by a
provision in the ordinance allowing proprietors to apply for an extension
beyond the July 1, 1981 relocation deadline.36 The court found neither
provision significantly reduced the negative impact of the ordinance on
the public's right of access to constitutionally protected material.37
Arguably, the attention accorded the Young decision by the court in
Alexander emphasizes the consternation felt by many over the amount of
constitutional protection to be afforded materials which, albeit non-ob-
scene,38 are considered tasteless and offensive. Justice Stevens aptly ex-
pressed this viewpoint in his Young opinion, stating:
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate
the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artis-
tic value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of
expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the inter-
est in untrammeled political debate . . . . [F]ew of us would march
our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see
'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice. 39
The broad power of a city to zone for the welfare of its citizenry must
be exercised within constitutional limits.40 Accordingly, a municipality
is subject to a standard of judicial review determined by the nature of the
right assertedly threatened or violated rather than by the power being
exercised or the specific limitation imposed.41 A zoning law which ad-
bookstore owner would have difficulty predicting the proportion of "adult trade" on any
given day, thus subjecting the owner to an "unavoidable risk" of violating the ordinance.
Id at 1167. Similarly, evidence showed that it would not be commercially feasible for an
adult theater operator to exhibit both "general release" and adult films. Id
35. 698 F.2d at 939.
36. District court testimony revealed that an extension would be granted only to al-
low owners the opportunity to recoup their initial investments and only if the property
could not be put to any other use. Id
37. 698 F.2d at 939.
38. Professor Tribe has written,
The Supreme Court in Ameruan Mini Theaters has signaled important limits on its
willingness to entertain content-based restrictions on protected expression. ...
[A] content-based discrimination is more likely to be upheld if the government's
real interest is not in protecting citizens from exposure to the speech as such but
rather in such 'secondary effects' as the physical deterioration and crime which
accompany the concentration of 'adult' theaters in a 'red light' district.
L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 679.
39. Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
40. Zoning ordinances are clearly permissible as long as they do not infringe on con-
stitutionally protected rights. The Court in Schad stated,
The power of local governments to zone and control land use is undoubtedly
broad and its proper exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory
quality of life in both urban and rural communities. But the zoning power is not
infinite and unchallengeable; it 'must be exercised within constitutional limits.'
452 U.S. at 68; accord Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
41. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
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versely affects property interests will be sustained if it is rationally related
to legitimate state concerns and does not deprive the property owner of
use of his property.42 When a zoning law infringes upon a protected
liberty, however, it must be narrowly drawn and further a substantial
governmental interest. 4 3 A zoning scheme enacted to restrict adult en-
tertainment is unconstitutional, and cannot be sustained under the lim-
ited exception carved out in Young, if it has the effect of restricting public
access to constitutionally protected material. 44 By contrast, an ordinance
will be upheld where the evidence establishes that the zoning regulation
affects only location and does not reduce the public's access to protected
speech.45
At issue is how to fashion rules for protected speech in public places
which accommodate the demands of individuals and communities and
yet shelter each from intrusion by the other. Although sexually explicit
expression may have a "lesser" value than other lawful speech,46 particu-
larly political debate,47 a strong constitutional aversion to content-based
regulation of expression will override any municipal statute prohibiting
or greatly restricting public access to non-obscene adult material.48 A
contrary result would mean setting a dangerous precedent for govern-
ment control of other forms of expression.49 The stated purpose of sec-
tion 540.410(a) illustrates the pressing need to find a way for a locality to
protect the quality and character of community life without concur-
rently "making the closed mind a principal feature of the open soci-
ety."50 A zoning ordinance which allows enough sites for adult theaters
and bookstores to accommodate all patrons does not inhibit access to
sexually explicit material.51 Such an ordinance may classify adult mate-
42. Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1982). Schad involved a New Jersey ordi-
nance which prohibited live entertainment in the Mt. Ephraim borough. Appellants, who
operated an adult bookstore in the borough's commercial zone, installed a coin operated
mechanism which enabled customers to observe a live nude dancer. They were convicted
for violating the ordinance. The Supreme Court overturned the convictions and struck
down the ordinance because the borough failed to justify the exclusion of live entertain-
ment from the commercial uses allowed in the borough. Id; accord Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
43. Schad, 452 U.S. at 68.
44. See Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35.
45. See 531 F. Supp. at 1172 n.13.
46. See supra note 38.
47. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (defamation of
political candidate) ("It can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its
fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office.').
48. Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
49. L. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 674 n.13.
50. H. KALVEN, THE AMERICAN NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 159 (1965).
51. Young, 427 U.S. at 62. The decision in Young leaves open exactly how much re-
straint is compatible with an essentially free market in adult fare. A zoning ordinance
[Vol. 10
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rial in terms of content only if it does so to define the locations at which
material of this kind is available.5
2
The restricting of public access to constitutionally protected materials
becomes a significant concern when addressing the first amendment im-
plications of municipal ordinances regulating the locations of businesses
distributing sexually oriented entertainment. 53 When municipalities ex-
ercise their police powers to protect city neighborhoods against deteriora-
tion, they must not infringe upon freedom of expression.54 Instead, they
must draw regulations narrowly enough to minimize the impact that
state action has on first amendment guarantees. 55 If such action serves to
severely curtail the public's access to protected sexually oriented mate-
rial, it will be struck down as unconstitutional.56 As Alexander indicates,
the courts will continue to give priority to first amendment rights unless
the government can demonstrate a legitimate and substantial interest for
making a limited exception to the prohibition against content-based zon-
ing ordinances. The impact of an ordinance on free expression must be
incidental and minimal to withstand constitutional attack if it has the
effect of restricting access to communication protected by the first
amendment.
57
Criminal Law-BATrERED CHILD SYNDROME-State v. Durfee, 322
N.W.2d 778 (Minn. 1982).
In 1982, 1.1 million cases of child abuse and neglect were reported in
the United States.i In response to the recognized problem, every state
now requires the reporting of child abuse and neglect cases when discov-
adopted by the St. Paul City Council subsequent to the Alexander decision prohibits adult
entertainment establishments from being located within 200 feet of residential property or
1320 feet from each other in residential neighborhoods; the limit is reduced to 300 feet in
the downtown area. Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Oct. 16, 1983, at 2B, cols. 5-6.
52. Young, 427 U.S. at 62.
53. Schad, 452 U.S. at 70.
54. See supra note 3.
55. Schad, 452 U.S. at 70.
56. Alexander, 698 F.2d at 936.
57. Id at 937.
1. Child Abuse-Laws Being Overhauled to Safeguard Youngsters, 69 A.B.A.J. 1009 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Child Abuse]. Much has been written about child abuse in recent
years. See generally M. COHN, AN APPROACH TO PREVENTING CHILD ABUSE (1981); J.
COSTA & G. NELSON, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: LEGISLATION, REPORTING AND PRE-
VENTION (1978); V. FONTANA, THE MALTREATED CHILD: THE MALTREATMENT SYN-
DROME IN CHILDREN-A MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL GUIDE (4th ed. 1979); J.
GIOVANNONI & R. BECERRA, DEFINING CHILD ABUSE (1979); S. NAGI, CHILD MAL-
TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1977); S.
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